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Abstract 
Using a stochastic frontier model and a comprehensive dataset, we study factors that affect 
corporate efficiency in Europe. We find that (i) larger firms are less efficient than smaller firms, 
(ii) greater leverage contributes to corporate efficiency, and (iii) high competition is less 
conductive to efficiency than moderate or low competition. In terms of ownership, we find that 
(iv) efficiency increases when a majority owner must deal with minority shareholders and that 
(v) domestic majority owners improve efficiency more than foreign majority owners when no 
minority shareholders are present, but (vi) the opposite is true when minority shareholders hold 
a substantial fraction of the firm’s equity. In the analysis, we distinguish between a pre-crisis 
period (2001–2008) and a post-crisis period (2009-2011), and find that our results are sensitive 
to the period of observation. 
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1. Introduction  
What determines corporate efficiency is a central question in economics and finance. Corporate 
(technical or production) efficiency can be defined as the ability of a firm to produce the most 
output with a given amount of inputs. Several factors can reduce the ability of a firm to operate 
at the best (most efficient) technical level. First, as firms grow larger, they may lose focus and 
become more complacent and prone to agency problems (Monsen and Downs, 1965; 
Leibenstein, 1966; Mueller, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Dhawan, 2001; Campa and 
Kedia, 2002; Villalonga, 2004). Lack of competition may also make firms become more 
complacent (Aghion et al., 1999; Raith, 2003; Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007). In finance, the 
free-cash flow hypothesis similarly suggests that leverage promotes efficiency because the 
servicing of debt puts constraints on managerial discretion (Jensen, 1986). Ownership 
concentration and foreign ownership are also generally believed to be conducive to more 
efficient operation (Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Blomström et al., 2001; Gugler, 2001; Sánchez-
Ballesta and García-Meca, 2007; Temouri et al., 2008). Yet, to date, empirical research on the 
determinants of corporate efficiency and performance is fragmented (Shyu, 2013; Arocena and 
Oliveros, 2012; Cabeza-García and Gómez-Ansón, 2011; Margaritis and Psillaki, 2010; Weill, 
2008; Barth et al., 2003; Dilling-Hansen et al., 2003; Palia and Lichtenberg, 1999). The extant 
literature typically analyzes the effects of firm size, competition, capital structure, and 
ownership characteristics in isolation, despite the fact that these factors may be closely 
intertwined. Moreover, the literature tends to focus on specific industries or countries, raising 
concerns about generalizability. 
In this paper, we take a more integrated approach. We analyze the effects of size, 
competition, capital structure, and ownership characteristics in a large and comprehensive 
dataset covering more than 3 million firm/year observations. The analysis covers both firms 
operating in “old” European Union (EU) countries and in “new” EU countries,1 as well as 
manufacturing and services firms. Methodologically, we employ a stochastic production 
frontier model. 
Our results indicate that several factors contribute to corporate efficiency in Europe. We 
find that larger firms are less efficient than smaller firms, and that leverage contributes to 
corporate efficiency. Furthermore, moderate competition in the product market is associated 
                                                 
1 Specifically, we use firm-level data from the following countries. Old EU: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. New EU: Bulgaria, 
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia. 
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with greater efficiency in old EU countries. In new EU countries both moderate and low 
competition are associated with greater efficiency.  
As expected, we find a positive association between ownership concentration and 
efficiency. Interestingly, the effect of foreign ownership appears to be contingent on whether 
control is divided. When minority shareholders hold a substantial fraction of the firm’s equity, 
foreign majority ownership is conducive to efficiency. However, if there are no minority 
shareholders, domestic majority owners are superior. Overall, our results demonstrate that 
capital structure and ownership characteristics, as well as a number of other factors, matter for 
corporate efficiency in European countries. 
The paper makes a number of important contributions to the literature. We focus on the 
technical efficiency of firms, instead of accounting ratios. Technical efficiency is estimated 
using the stochastic production possibility frontier approach (SFA) introduced by Aigner et al. 
(1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977) and further developed by Battese and Coelli 
(1988, 1992) and Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000). More precisely, we use a time-invariant 
technical efficiency model for panel data adjusted to account for the specific two-digit (NACE) 
industries in which firms operate.2 This approach also addresses the potential problem of 
unobserved (fixed) firm heterogeneity, including the endogeneity of firm ownership with 
respect to its efficiency. Furthermore, by using several short panels (with maximum four years), 
we overcome the shortcomings of time-invariant firm-level inefficiency, while benefitting from 
easier identification and smaller bias (Green, 2005 and Cornwell and Schmidt, 2008, among 
others). 
Our results highlight the potential for efficiency associated with firm growth. As firms 
grow larger and expand their scale of operations, they become more complacent or prone to 
agency problems (Campa and Kedia, 2002; Mansi and Reeb, 2002; Villalonga, 2004). 
Managers with cash in hand may grant themselves higher salaries or invest in “pet projects”. 
The situation may be aggravated by higher bureaucracy, higher communication costs and a 
greater resistance to change than in smaller firms. As our dataset provides a wide coverage of 
small and medium firms, we can analyze the effect of firm size on firm efficiency with greater 
reliability than in previous studies.  
We also highlight the role of capital and ownership structures in affecting corporate 
efficiency. Capital structure and concentrated ownership can both exert a disciplining effect on 
                                                 
2 Chirinko at al. (2010) show that a production function accounting for interactions with industrial dummies is 
flexible and with their sample of 1,860 firms, even the OLS estimates are consistent. 
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managers, albeit for different reasons. Higher leverage helps discipline managers by reducing 
the amount of cash at their disposal and by increasing the cost of misbehavior (Jensen, 1986). 
Higher ownership concentration, on the other hand, motivates owners to closely monitor 
managers, so that their actions comply with firm goals. Different degrees of concentration can 
potentially have different implications for firm efficiency. For each firm in the sample, we are 
able to determine ownership concentration, its domestic or foreign origin, and the degree to 
which owners control the firm. Following legal standards, we distinguish several ownership 
categories that provide owners with different degrees of control, including potential coalitions 
of owners. In particular, we distinguish between majority ownership, monitored majority 
ownership, majority ownership plus blocking minority, controlling blocking minority and 
combined controlling minority ownership. The available information on ownership structures 
allows us to document its effects on firm efficiency to an extent not found in earlier studies. 
On the temporal dimension, we distinguish between a pre-crisis period (2001–2008) 
and a post-crisis period (2009–2011). Two results stand out. First, we find that the magnitude 
of coefficients is often smaller in absolute value in the post-crisis period than in the pre-crisis 
period. This is not unexpected. During a severe downturn, many of the most inefficient firms 
may drop out of the sample. Thus, firms may on average be closer to the efficiency frontier in 
the later part of the sample. More surprising is the fact that the sign of many coefficients change 
after the crisis. In some cases, the results are easy to rationalize. For instance, consistent with 
the free cash flow hypothesis, before the crisis we find that leverage is associated with greater 
efficiency. However, after the crisis, leverage is associated with lower efficiency. The latter 
result may be due to the fact that, after the crisis, highly leveraged firms may find it difficult to 
refinance their operations. While interesting, we view these temporal patterns with caution and 
focus mostly on the pre-crisis period when business conditions were arguably more “normal”. 
A full investigation of the implications of the 2008 financial crisis on efficiency is left for future 
research.  
Finally, we believe the fact that the firms in our dataset constitute the bulk of the 
economic activity in the EU countries makes our analysis stronger because the potential bias 
due to focusing on specific sectors is negligible. At the same time we are also able to distinguish 
two-digit industrial sectors in which the firms operate and aggregate our results across the two 
key sectors: manufacturing and services. Further, in our analysis we include additional firm 
and market characteristics (size, leverage, market concentration) and, hence, we are able to 
provide substantially richer results in terms of how these characteristics potentially effect firm 
efficiency. 
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The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we review the literature on the links 
relevant to firm performance and efficiency. The methodology is described in section 3. In 
section 4 we introduce our data, describe firm and market characteristics and ownership 
categories, and formulate our hypotheses. In section 5 we present our empirical results and 
conclude in section 6. 
 
2. Firm performance, ownership, and capital structure: A selective literature review 
From the empirical point of view, firm performance can be measured in a number of ways. 
Traditionally, financial ratios (e.g. return on equity, return on assets) have been the predominant 
choice. Empirical studies employing this type of measure to assess the effect of majority 
ownership on firm performance have produced mixed and inconclusive results. For example, 
Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) and Claessens et al. (2002) report a positive relationship 
between ownership concentration and shareholder value as well as firm performance. However, 
scholars have also argued in favor of a non-linear relationship between firm performance and 
ownership. A U-shaped link has been found between managerial ownership and firm value 
(Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990) as well as between government ownership 
and firm performance (Tian and Estrin, 2008). In contrast, Demsetz and Lehn (1985), 
Holderness and Sheehan (1988), and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) find no statistical 
relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. Finally, Thomsen, Pedersen, 
and Kvist (2006) determine a negative association between blocking ownership and firm 
performance for the largest firms in Continental Europe. 
The use of financial ratios to measure performance has important drawbacks, though. 
Most importantly, financial ratios can easily be manipulated for tax or other reasons particularly 
in countries where the rule of law is weak and among private medium and small enterprises, 
which constitute the bulk of our sample (Demsetz, 1996; Schulze et al, 2001; Durand and 
Vargas, 2003). For instance, family owners may be more willing to take their earnings in the 
form of capital gains rather than salaries, thus potentially explaining the greater liquidity and 
profitability of European family-owned firms (Belenzon, Patacconi, and Zarutskie, 2014). 
Technical efficiency, on the other hand, because it simply measures a firm’s ability to produce 
the maximum output from a given set of inputs, may be harder or less important to manipulate, 
although its estimation may be fraught with technical difficulties, too. 
Relatively few empirical studies use technical efficiency instead of accounting 
measures. According to Dilling-Hansen, Madsen, and Smith (2003), ownership concentration 
does not translate into higher efficiency. In contrast, Nanka-Bruce (2006) and Amornkitvikai 
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and Harvie (2011) report positive relations between ownership concentration and efficiency. 
Moreover, ownership type is also found to be important. For example, state-owned firms are 
reported to be inefficient compared to private-owned firms (Nanka-Bruce, 2006; Roy and 
Yvrande-Billon, 2007; Cabeza-García and Gómez-Ansón, 2011; Arocena and Oliveros, 2012). 
Also, foreign ownership is associated with higher efficiency as demonstrated by Fukuyama et 
al. (1999); Goldar, Renganathan, and Banga (2003); Bottasso and Sembenelli (2004); and 
Hanousek et al. (2012). Finally, Durand and Vargas (2003) find owner-controlled firms to be 
more efficient than manager-controlled firms. 
The other stream of literature focuses on the link between firm performance and capital 
structure (see Myers, 1977; Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990; Margaritis and Psillaki, 2007; and Weill, 
2008; among others). Capital structure is hypothesized to have an effect on firm performance 
because debt is often used as an alternative or supplementary tool to managerial ownership. On 
the one hand, higher debt has a disciplining effect on managers through the reduction of the 
free cash flow at their disposal and the increase of the probability of default (Jensen, 1986). 
The positive relationship between firm capital structure and its performance measured by 
technical efficiency have been reported by Sena (2006), Mok et al. (2007), Margaritis and 
Psillaki (2007), and Weill (2008). On the other hand, higher debt leads to a conflict of interest 
between shareholders and debtholders, suggesting negative relations between debt and 
performance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977; Harris and Raviv, 1991). Therefore, 
higher leverage is associated with lower firm efficiency (Weill, 2008; Seelanatha, 2010). 
Researchers have become interested in the links between capital structure, ownership 
structure and firm performance only recently, though. For example, Brailsford et al. (2002), 
Short et al. (2002), and King and Santor (2008) report a positive effect of concentrated 
ownership on capital structure and firm performance, while Duc Nam and Thi Phuong Vy 
(2013) report a negative impact of foreign ownership on firm performance and a positive 
impact on capital structure. Anderson and Reeb (2003) find no significant effect. Managerial 
ownership is found to be marginal, or even negative if large shareholders are not present (Short 
et al., 2002; Wahba, 2013). The link between firm technical efficiency, capital structure and 
ownership structure has been even less investigated, though a positive association was found 
by Margaritis and Psillaki (2010). 
Overall, the existing empirical literature on the link between capital structure, 
ownership structure and firm performance and/or efficiency is scarce. Scholars use small and 
unrepresentative samples of firms and focus on a particular industry or one country at most. It 
is not clear whether the ownership concentration effect on firm technical efficiency and its 
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capital structure depends on the country, the period studied, or other factors. In this paper we 
aim to overcome most of the shortcomings present in earlier studies by providing systematic 
evidence of the effect of ownership and capital structure on firm technical efficiency for a large 
sample of firms from EU economies over the period 2001 to 2011. 
 
3. Modeling strategy 
What drives a firm’s efficiency? We will analyze this question in two steps by employing 
stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). First, we describe how a firm’s efficiency is derived from 
the stochastic production possibility frontier in section 3.1. In the second step, we relate the 
technical efficiency of a firm—defined as the distance from the efficiency frontier—to a 
number of factors that are shown in the literature to affect it: firm specific characteristics (size, 
capital structure, degree of competition) and ownership structure (section 3.2). Hence, the 
estimated model consists of two equations: a specification describing the efficiency frontier 
and a specification modeling the determinants of efficiency. However, the estimation itself is 
performed within a one-stage procedure. 
We perform the estimation on a series of short panels with fixed effects that enables 
easy identification, requires the least restrictive assumptions, alleviates the potential problem 
of unobserved (fixed) firm heterogeneity, lowers potential estimation bias, and accounts for the 
endogeneity of firm ownership structures with respect to its efficiency.3 The model is estimated 
using the maximum likelihood one-stage procedure originally designed by Battese and Coelli 
(1995). We obtain estimates of the efficiency frontier parameters as well as estimates of 
efficiency determinants. Our estimation is performed in a similar manner as Weill (2008) and 
the procedure delivers efficient estimates that are free of potential correlation among variables. 
Finally, estimation is performed separately for firms operating in manufacturing and services, 
                                                 
3 The use of the fixed effects estimation approach is motivated by two assumptions. First, we can make the 
assumption that unobservable effects of the ownership structures are typically correlated with the explanatory 
variables and error term in the model and do not change over time. In this case the bias arising from unobserved 
heterogeneity can be removed by estimating the fixed effects model. The fixed effects model contains an 
individual specific constant that captures all time-invariant (observed as well as unobserved) characteristics. The 
second assumption concerns the situation in which unobservable ownership effects vary over time. In this case 
one might use instrumental variables (IV) to account for the selection/endogeneity problem that would be present 
under specific conditions, for example in case of firm privatization. This is not our case, though. Moreover, the 
success of the IV estimation depends heavily on finding adequate instrumental variables that satisfy the exogeneity 
condition. However, suitable IVs are usually difficult to obtain, especially in the case of empirical studies with 
extremely large data-sets, which is our case. Fixed effect estimation as well as IVs have also been identified as an 
appropriate approach to account for the endogeneity of ownership structures by Estrin et al. (2009). Hence, fixed 
effects estimation is employed as the most suitable and useful solution. 
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and for two groups: old and new EU countries. This set-up provides four sets of key results 
plus additional evidence as a robustness check. 
 
3.1 Firm efficiency 
The SFA framework has its roots in the stochastic production frontier models introduced 
simultaneously by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977), and further 
adapted for panel data by Schmidt and Sickles (1984), Khumbhakar (1990), Battese and Coelli 
(1995), and Greene (2005).4 The methodology helps to explain firm-level differences in 
efficiency as a function of the number of explanatory variables, and this makes it superior to 
estimating the average efficiency relative to the “best practice”. 
Technical efficiency under single-output production is modeled within a stochastic 
production possibility frontier. We opt for this parametric approach for one key reason: SFA 
allows for hypothesis testing, unlike the non-parametric approach of data envelopment analysis 
(see Fried at al., 1993). Since our analysis is framed by multiple hypothesis testing, SFA 
represents a natural choice.5 Further, given that our production function has a very flexible 
functional form with parameters varying across double digit industries, and the number of 
observations exceeds several million, our parametric specification does not represent a major 
restriction with respect to the functional form. 
 The methodology of the stochastic frontier begins with the production function 𝑦𝑡 =
𝑓(𝑥𝑡;  𝛽) relating inputs (x) to the resulting output (y), which is produced efficiently. However, 
as the production involves some degree of inefficiency, the production function is modified to 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑥𝑡; 𝛽) ∙ 𝑇𝐸𝑖. The firm’s technical efficiency TEi represents the non-negative ratio of 
observed output to the maximum feasible output and lies within the interval (0,1] as the firm’s 
output is assumed to be positive. A firm employs all inputs efficiently and achieves an optimal 
output if TEi = 1 while TEi smaller than one indicates a degree of inefficiency in firm’s 
production. Further, two assumptions are made. First, efficiency is assumed to be a stochastic 
variable with a distribution common to all firms and can be written as TEi = exp {-uit}, since if 
                                                 
4 For a detailed survey see Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000). 
5 Other options to measure the effects of a particular variable on a firm‘s efficiency are the differences-in-
differences approach or matching. By using a differences-in-differences approach we could analyze for example 
the firm’s efficiency before and after a change in its ownership structure. However, it is not clear when such a 
change materializes into an effect. Other changes are even harder to account for. Further, the advantage of the 
matching procedure is associated with the control for one-dimensional "treatment", which can be for example 
majority ownership by a domestic owner. However, choosing one control group poses a dilemma whether it is the 
right choiceL why should other possible control groups (dispersed ownership, minority controlled, foreign 
majority controlled, etc.) be less suitable choices? 
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0 <TEi ≤ 1, then uit ≥ 0. Second, a firm’s output is also assumed to be subject to various random 
shocks (from machinery breakdown to bad weather) that are denoted as exp(vit). The production 
function is then written as 𝑦𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑥𝑡; 𝛽) ∙ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝑢𝑖𝑡) ∙ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑣𝑖𝑡). After taking the natural log of 
both sides we obtain 
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝑘
𝑗=1 𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡.      (1) 
In this general specification vit is a pure noise component and a two-sided normally distributed 
variable, while uit is the nonnegative technical inefficiency component showing the distance 
from the efficiency frontier. Both terms form a compound error term with an a priori unknown 
distribution. 
In order to account for changes in technical inefficiency over time, researchers have 
primarily two main options available. First, time-varying inefficiency is usually introduced 
directly into the model (1) as 𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝜂(𝑡 − 𝑇𝑖))𝑢𝑖, where Ti is the last period in the panel 
of i firms. In this notation, coefficient eta (η) enables us to distinguish whether the efficiency 
increases or decreases over time. However, this decay-type model of time-varying inefficiency 
relies on a set of relatively strong assumptions, including a truncated normal distribution and 
additional conditions needed for a joint identification of 𝑢𝑖𝑡, 𝑣𝑖𝑡, and η. There have been 
proposed several modifications, including so-called “true fixed effect” models (for an overview 
and extensive discussion see Green, 2008). However, given the size of the data, the suggested 
procedures cannot be run even on subsamples by country and selected sectors.  
Therefore, we opt for the second possibility: estimating a time-invariant technical 
inefficiency model (1) separately in a series of short panels. The time dimension is then brought 
in by merging the results from the short panels. The use of short panels has the advantage of a 
feasible assumption of constant inefficiency. Further, the small time dimension enables easier 
estimation and any potential bias of the estimated parameters in a fixed-effect stochastic 
frontier model resulting from a small number of periods is actually fairy moderate as 
demonstrated by Green (2005). Therefore, we opt for estimating the model via a series of three 
short panels (2001–2004, 2005–2008, and 2009–2011).  
When modeling production we follow the mainstream of the literature and in the 
specification below we interact the parameters of the Cobb-Douglas function with two-digit 
NACE sectors to employ a flexible form that accounts for sector specifics.6 Formally, our 
                                                 
6 The Cobb-Douglas function represents a less restrictive production function and has been shown empirically to 
fit a number of the studies cited in section 2 as well as the recent contribution of Chirinko et al. (2010), who 
support its robust behavior. Specifically, they show that fixing the production function within a double digit 
industry provides needed flexibility and assures the consistency of the underlying OLS estimation. 
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model of the efficiency frontier of I firms (i = 1,…,I) in J two-digit NACE sectors (j=1,…,J) 
over T time periods (t = 1,…,T) is specified as follows: 
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑡 = ∑ [𝛽0𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑙𝑖𝑡]𝑗=1,…,𝐽 ∙ 𝐼𝐷𝑖𝑡𝑗 + 𝜙𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡. (2) 
 
In specification (2) individual corporate performance yit is expressed as the natural log of the 
value added of firm i at time t; firm turnover is used as an alternative measure. Following the 
practice in the literature (Margaritis and Psillaki, 2010; Arocena and Oliveros, 2012), ln cit is 
the natural log of the capital of each firm i measured as total fixed assets plus working capital 
(measured as the difference between short-term tangible assets and short-term liabilities). 7 As 
an alternative and robustness check we also use total fixed assets. ln lit is the natural log of the 
firm’s labor, measured as the number of employees. A firm’s capital can be understood as a 
proxy for the machinery used in production as input while the number of employees directly 
measures labor input.  
Further, IDijt represents a vector of dummy variables to associate each firm with its 
specific industry sector j. It has been shown that ownership structures are often industry-
specific (Thomsen and Pedersen, 1998). Therefore, we employ industry-sector dummies to 
capture the specific effects of various sectors so that these effects do not interfere with the 
ownership effects. By the construction of specification (2), we consider the full set of 
interactions of double-digit NACE industry codes (45 industries in total) with the constant term 
and both inputs (capital and labor) to control for industry-specific effects. This set-up results 
in a flexible functional form: since the parameters of the production function vary across 45 
industries, the flexible functional form has 135 “beta” parameters (3x45). 
In addition, we also include in specification (2) yearly time dummies (t) to control for 
time-specific effects (country-wide economic development and business cycles) that are equal 
for all firms but vary over time. Since the estimation is done over a short panel (of maximum 
four years), adding a set of annual dummies allows us to capture the majority of industry-
specific price variation. The random error is denoted as vit, similarly as in (1), and uit ≥ 0 
                                                 
7 Total fixed assets plus working capital is the relevant measure in our efficiency analysis for the following reasons. 
First, the money tied up in working capital is costly since it earns zero rate of return (Kim et al., 1998). Second, 
managing working capital efficiently, however, stimulates growth opportunities and enables a firm to avoid costly 
interruptions to their day-to-day operations (Ross et al., 2005). Hence, working capital is kept invested constantly 
with the purpose to secure the constant production of the firm, which is directly linked to its efficiency. 
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represents inefficiency. Producer effects are required to be nonnegative because they represent 
the degree of inefficiency.8 
Finally, specification (2) is estimated country-by-country due to the extremely large 
data set and also because of potentially different efficiency levels in different countries. 
Country-wise estimation is preferred to including country dummies as it is a flexible form of 
country interaction with all parameters involved.  
 
3.2 Factors affecting firm efficiency 
In the second step we model how firm efficiency (ui) is determined by a set of key market and 
firm characteristics used widely in the literature, plus detailed firm ownership structure, a factor 
that has been identified in numerous relevant studies cited in section 2 as a key determinant of 
firm performance. Formally, the model for each year (period t) is specified as follows: 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖 + ∑ 𝛿𝑐𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑐
𝐿𝐶
𝑐=1 + 𝛿𝐺𝐻𝐻𝐼
𝐺+ μ I[year > 2008] 
+ ∑ 𝛾𝑗𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡
𝑗 ∗ 𝐼[𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 ≤ 2008]𝐽𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝜆𝑗𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡
𝑗𝐽
𝑗=1 ∗ 𝐼[𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 > 2008] +
+ ∑ 𝜉𝑡𝐼(𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 = 𝑡) + 𝜈𝑖𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1        (3) 
for all i = 1,…, N (firm index); t = 1,…, T (time index); c = 1,…, C (market concentration 
categories); and j = 1,…, J (ownership categories). The variables in (3) are defined as follows. 
First, we account for the Size of the firm, measured as log (total assets). Size captures 
the effect of firm size on inefficiency. It is often hypothesized that larger firms lose momentum 
to improve their efficiency (e.g., Diaz and Sanchez, 2008).9 
Second, we account for the effect of the capital structure of a firm on efficiency by 
including Debt (leverage) defined as Total Debt/Total Assets (in percent). Firms may finance a 
project by their own resources or by loans and thus become more indebted. Based on free-cash-
flow theory (Jensen, 1986), projects financed by loans must meet the market interest rate and 
hence, they are likely to be more profitable than projects financed by internal funds (free cash 
flow). Firms using chiefly loans become more leveraged and should engage in profitable 
                                                 
8 The inefficiency component of the model (uit) cannot be directly observed. However, it can be identified by 
using classical assumptions:  𝜈𝑖𝑡 ∼ 𝑖𝑖𝑑 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜈
2) and 𝑢𝑖~𝑖𝑖𝑑 𝑁
+(0, 𝜎𝑢
2). Then, the minimum squared error 
predictor of the technical efficiency of the ith firm is 𝐸(exp{−𝑢𝑖𝑡} |𝜀𝑖) = 𝐸(exp{𝛽(𝑡) ⋅ 𝑢𝑖} |𝜀𝑖) =
1−Φ[𝜎𝑖
∗−(𝜇𝑖
∗/𝜎𝑖
∗)]
1−Φ(−𝜇𝑖
∗/𝜎𝑖
∗)
⋅ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 {−𝜇𝑖
∗ +
1
2
𝜎𝑖
∗2}, where  𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝜈𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡 , 𝜇𝑖
∗ =
𝜇𝜎𝜈
2−𝑇𝜀𝑖𝜎
2
𝜎𝜈
2+𝑇𝜎2
, and 𝜎𝑖
∗2 =
𝜎𝜈
2𝜎2
𝜎𝜈
2+𝑇𝜎2
,. 
Since u is identified by the minimum squared error predictor, v is the remaining difference (ε – u). Further 
details are provided in Battese and Coelli (1992), Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000), or Greene (2008). 
9 In one version of our specification we also included the Age of the firm, defined as the number of years from a 
firm’s incorporation, that would capture the effect of a firm’s age on efficiency. The economic effect of Age was 
found negligible and therefore we opted for a parsimonious specification without this variable. 
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projects. This should positively affect the firms’ efficiency. On the other hand, according to the 
pecking order hypothesis, projects are financed according to a pre-committed schedule 
(Meyers, 1977).10 
Third, we account for the degree of competition that is defined by market concentration 
in the industry in which firms operate. Based on the x-inefficiency theory (Leibenstein, 1966), 
low competition provides a protective environment leading to higher corporate inefficiency. 
This inverse relationship means that a less concentrated industry, which provides more 
competition, should lead to increased efficiency (Nickell, 1997; Dilling-Hansen et al., 2003). 
Several studies have also demonstrated that an increase in market concentration above a certain 
threshold tends to negatively affect firm efficiency (Caves and Barton, 1990; Green and Mayes, 
1991; and Bailey, 1992). Hence, we include a market characteristic—the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) of industry concentration—as a proxy for the degree of competition.11 
Many industries compete on a global scale, whereas others have only local markets. Given EU 
single-market characteristics, we considered HHIL computed for the local competition and 
HHIG characterizing the “global”, i.e., single market concentration. HHIG is calculated only for 
manufacturing industries as technology is much easier to transfer than services. Further, we 
account for the regulatory perspective of the different (local) levels of industry concentration. 
Instead of using a continuous variable, in the case of HHIL we employ the scale used by the 
U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (2010) for assessing industry 
concentration levels. On this scale industries are considered non-concentrated if HHIL is less 
than 1500, moderately concentrated if HHIL lies between 1500 and 2500, and highly 
concentrated if HHIL is greater than 2500; the most recent thresholds are used. If a firm belongs 
to a moderately concentrated (moderate competition) or highly concentrated (low competition) 
industry, in each case the HHIL variable in (3) takes a value of one and zero otherwise. The 
effect of a low concentrated industry (high competition) is captured by a constant term. 
                                                 
10 The relevant literature identifies the firm leverage to be sector/industry-specific and the firm leverage is taken 
as exogenously given. For example, Frank and Goyal (2009) emphasize the importance of the industry median 
leverage in determining firm-specific leverage; we admit that the endogeneity issue could exist in general, though. 
Nevertheless, according to MacKey and Phillips (2005), industry fixed effects account for 13% of the variation in 
financial structure, firm fixed effects explain 54% and the remaining 33% is within-firm variation. Therefore, by 
accounting for industry-specific and firm-specific effects we are substantially narrowing the latitude for potential 
unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity. From our data we identify that the pattern of the NACE industry-
specific level of leverage is present in our sample. Hence, we use the debt/leverage variable as exogenous. Further, 
any potential endogeneity would be captured by the fixed effects estimation that we describe in connection to the 
potential ownership-structure endogeneity in section 3. 
11 Formally, the HHI for sector j is defined as the sum of the squares of a firm's market share in sector j, i.e. 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑗 =
∑  (𝑆𝑖/ ∑ 𝑆𝑘 ∙ 𝐼[𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑘 ∈ 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑗]
𝑁𝑗
𝑘=1 )
2𝑁𝑗
𝑖=1
∙ 𝐼[𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑗], where Si denotes turnover (sales) of firm i 
in sector j and Nj is the number of firms in sector j. 
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Fourth, we account for a possible shift in the mean of technical efficiency (parameter 
µ) caused by different economic conditions from 2009 on. Our data provide a sign of a 
structural break and although the effect of the global economic crisis is not our primary topic, 
we allow for a different (post-crisis) mean from 2009 onwards.  
Fifth, we account for the effects of diverse ownership structures over time. The 
ownership structure (OWNit
j) is defined in year t for each firm i to account for a specific 
ownership category j (domestic, foreign, and unknown domicile owners). The coefficients 𝛾𝑗 
and 𝜆𝑗   in (3) then capture the “transitory” effects of ownership; e.g. the effect of ownership in 
firms where an ownership structure underwent change. Further, since the crisis is potentially 
disruptive to firm operation we account for the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods by interacting 
ownership structures with pre-crisis and post-crisis dummies. To account for unobserved firm-
level heterogeneity, the model is estimated by using fixed effects that are captured by 
coefficient αi. 
In our sample there also exist many firms where no change in ownership occurred 
during the whole period under research and for those firms we cannot identify the coefficients 
𝛾𝑗 and 𝜆𝑗   in (3). In order to estimate the “permanent” effect of the ownership, i.e., the effect of 
ownership in firms with no change of ownership structure, we have to regress the estimated 
fixed effect (?̂?𝑖) on ownership categories of firms with no change in ownership. Formally, we 
estimate the following model: 
𝛼?̂? = ∑ 𝛾𝑗
∗𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡
𝑗 ∗ 𝐼[𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 ≤ 2008]𝐽𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝜆𝑗
∗𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡
𝑗𝐽
𝑗=1 ∗ 𝐼[𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 > 2008]
 ∑ 𝜂𝑘𝐼(𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 = 𝑘) + 𝜏𝑖
𝐾
𝑘=1       (4) 
for all i = 1,…, N (firm index); t = 1,…, T (time index);  j = 1,…, J (ownership categories); and 
k = 1,…, K (country dummies). 
To summarize, coefficients 𝛾𝑗 and 𝜆𝑗   associated with the ownership effect estimated 
via panel fixed-effects specification (3) represent transitory (or changes in) ownership effects, 
while coefficients 𝛾𝑗
∗ and 𝜆𝑗
∗ from (4) represent the permanent effect of unchanged ownership. 
The employed variables of the ownership structure also distinguish the extent of ownership 
concentration along with the extent of control over a firm. The ownership categories require a 
more detailed explanation, and therefore we elaborate more on the ownership categories in 
section 4.3. 
In order to control for country and time specifics we include the relevant dummies. 
While time dummies usually control for different effects of the business cycle, country fixed 
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effects would account for various measures of country-specific variation, such as financial 
development and the legal environment (see for example Francis et al., 2013). 
The estimation results of (in)efficiency regressions (3) should be interpreted as follows. 
Larger coefficients associated with specific ownership categories mean that under a particular 
ownership type, a firm moves further from the efficiency frontier. Hence, a larger positive 
coefficient means that under that specific type of ownership the firm is less efficient. On the 
contrary, a smaller coefficient value illustrates the fact that a firm is closing the gap to the 
efficiency frontier. For example, in the case of the two coefficients γ1 > γ2, the ownership type 
associated with the coefficient γ2 has a smaller distance from the efficiency frontier and, hence, 
contributes to firm efficiency more than the ownership type associated with the coefficient γ1. 
A similar interpretation applies to firm characteristics, as well. 
 
4. Data, variables, and hypotheses 
4.1 Data 
We employ firm-level unbalanced panel data for the period 2001–2011 from the Amadeus 
database covering 22 countries of the European Union. As these are multiproduct firms we are 
unable to obtain exact information about the quantities (input, output) connected with the 
production process of each product of a firm. For this reason we follow the standard approach 
in the literature and employ financial variables from firms’ balance sheets (see Coelli et al., 
2005 for an overview). We further combine the balance-sheet data with ownership data 
obtained from Amadeus. Let us note that each edition of the Amadeus database covers only the 
current ownership structure. Therefore, we use several editions of the Amadeus database to 
reconstruct end-of-the-year ownership structures for the period under research. Altogether we 
work with unique firm-level matched panel data of 3,375,595 firm/year observations for the 
period from 2001 to 2011. 
In order to capture the difference between EU members as well as the differences across 
sectors, we divide the sample into two sub-samples of old and new EU countries. Due to the 
fact that we do not have adequate data for firms from all EU countries, our division between 
old and new EU members does not correspond to the official one, but rather reflects data 
availability. Hence, the old EU group in the scope of our analysis includes Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom. Further, from the data availability perspective, the new EU group is defined 
as Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, and 
Slovakia. Both groups are further divided into firms operating in the manufacturing and 
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services sectors. Since we are able to precisely distinguish each firm’s domicile, geographical 
separation is not an issue.  
 
4.2 Sample 
Basic descriptive statistics of the firm-level balance-sheet data associated with equations (2) 
and (3) are summarized in Table 1 (manufacturing) and Table 2 (services). The value added 
and turnover of firms operating in the old EU countries is on average higher than the value 
added of the new EU firms in both manufacturing and service sectors. The old EU firms in the 
manufacturing sector employ less capital and less labor when compared to the new EU 
manufacturing firms. The situation in service sectors is the opposite. The overall comparison 
of new and old EU firms covered by the data shows that the new EU segment of the dataset is 
smaller in terms of number of observations, however, it mostly contains larger and more 
influential firms. Understandably, the oldest and largest firms are found in the old EU group. 
Firms seem to be slightly more leveraged in the manufacturing sector, with the old EU firms 
having average leverage ratios almost double what the new EU members have. 
 
4.3 Ownership categories 
Based on the derived efficiency we examine the impact of the ownership structure on estimated 
efficiency. Ownership type and concentration has been recognized as an important determinant 
of firm performance in developed economies (Temouri et al., 2008; Hill and Snell, 1989) as 
well as emerging European economies (Estrin et al., 2009). We define the ownership variables 
with respect to country-specific legal rules as argued in Gugler (2003), using dummy variables 
for specific ownership categories rather than percentages of their share holdings. The specific 
ownership categories that are associated with a legally grounded extent of control differ in the 
countries in our sample. Hence, the use of dummy variables is more appropriate as it maintains 
the various extents of control level across countries. This approach is especially important 
when we analyze the effects of composite ownership categories and potential coalitions (details 
are provided below). 
Holders of different concentration thresholds have different opportunities to influence 
corporate governance. Majority ownership represents the highest degree of concentrated 
ownership, while minority ownership can be viewed as a form of moderately dispersed 
ownership. Hence, we define several specific ownership categories to distinguish the 
diminishing extent of control these categories provide. Rather than using exact percentage 
stakes, we opt for dummy variables that differentiate various ownership categories and allow 
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us to provide more comprehensive results. All ownership categories are exclusively defined 
and they are also distinguished by domestic and foreign ownership, as well as those without a 
known domicile. The categories of foreign ownership defined below are based on stakes above 
10% and are considered to represent FDI ownership (more details are provided in section 4.3). 
Further, the data do not involve problems related to pyramid structures. 
Our ownership categories are listed below with a greater ability to control (majority) 
first; each subsequent ownership category has less ability to control. Majority ownership is a 
dummy variable that is coded 1 when an owner holds more than a 50% stake in a firm and the 
rest of the stakes represent only dispersed ownership; it is coded 0 otherwise. Majority 
ownership grants the owner the right to staff management and the supervisory board, to alter 
and transfer firms’ assets, and to make crucial strategic decisions at general shareholder 
meetings. Through management and the supervisory board, majority ownership also facilitates 
more direct executive control of the company. This category provides the majority owner with 
effective control over the company. 
Further, we construct composite ownership categories that reflect the reality of 
ownership control among firms. Monitored majority ownership is a dummy variable that is 
coded 1 when a majority owner (holding more than a 50% stake in a firm) is confronted with 
a minority owner that holds a stake that is greater than the country-specific legal minority 
percentage threshold (see below); it is coded 0 otherwise. The legal minority percentage 
threshold is usually not very large, but legal minority owners are potentially important because 
the law entitles them to call general shareholder meetings and obstruct decisions by delaying 
implementation through lengthy court proceedings. In our sample, the legal minority thresholds 
are as follows: 20% (Belgium and Italy), 10% (Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, 
Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, and the United Kingdom), 5% 
(Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain). 
Majority ownership plus blocking minority is a dummy variable that is coded 1 when 
there is a majority owner (holding more than a 50% stake in a firm) confronted with a minority 
owner that holds a stake higher than the legally required blocking minority threshold; it is coded 
0 otherwise. The blocking minority threshold differs from country to country. In our sample, 
blocking minority thresholds are as follows: 33.3% (France and Italy), 33% (the Czech 
Republic, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, and Sweden), 25% (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and the United 
Kingdom). This ownership category reflects the situation in firms where the majority owner is 
confronted with a strong minority owner that might pursue its own interests. A blocking 
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minority enables a strong minority owner to contest the decisions of a majority owner. For all 
three majority-type categories above, we are also able to distinguish domestic and foreign 
owners and to apply this distinction throughout the estimation. 
Two minority categories complete our ownership structures. Controlling blocking 
minority ownership is a category representing a blocking minority owner whose stake is higher 
than the sum of the stakes of all the remaining known (identified) owners. In this case it is 
coded 1 and zero otherwise. This category represents a weak form of control, since even a 
blocking minority owner can exercise control over highly dispersed owners. 
Combined controlling minority ownership is a category that is coded 1 when there are 
two minority owners whose combined stake exceeds the sum of all the remaining stakes held 
by the rest of the identified owners; it is coded 0 otherwise. These two owners cannot 
individually control the firm. They also cannot effectively act against each other as individually 
they do not have enough voting power. However, they may coordinate their steps or form a 
coalition and control the company via the combined voting rights that give them a majority. 
Finally, a constant captures the highly dispersed or unknown ownership of a firm. In 
this case the firm either exhibits highly dispersed ownership or does not report its ownership. 
As we are unable to make reasonable inferences in terms of the ownership captured by a 
constant, we do not report the coefficients for the sake of conserving space. 
 
4.4 Testable hypotheses 
We formulate three hypotheses in order to test how the firm characteristics, extent of control 
embodied in the ownership concentration, and domestic versus foreign ownership affect the 
efficiency of the firm. The formulation of our hypotheses is deeply rooted in the literature: on 
top of the arguments voiced in sections 1 and 2, we elaborate on specific ownership categories 
and their links with efficiency. 
First, as detailed earlier, large firms might be less efficient than smaller ones (Diaz and 
Sanchez, 2008), more leveraged (indebted) firms might be more efficient than those using 
internal funds (Jensen, 1986), and firms operating in a highly concentrated industry with a low-
competition environment might suffer from higher inefficiency. Hence, various firm 
characteristics related to capital structure, market environment, etc. are often linked to firm 
efficiency and lead to the formulation of our first hypothesis. Due to the differences in impact, 
we formulate the hypothesis in a general way thus: 
Hypothesis 1. H0: Firm characteristics do not effect a firm’s efficiency. 
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Given the fragmented empirical work and partly missing theoretical basis we do not 
present a full set of alternative hypotheses here. One can obviously expect that larger and older 
firms are likely to be less efficient compared to smaller and younger ones, respectively. 
Similarly, based on the literature on capital structure, one can expect that firms with higher 
leverage would be more efficient, as managers will be forced to service a higher debt.  
Second, the literature examining the agency problem arising from the separation of 
ownership and control often argues that managers might follow goals other than those the 
owners would prefer. Because of this, a concentrated ownership structure might lead to higher 
firm efficiency, since it results in a superior monitoring of managers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; 
Hill and Snell, 1989). On the other hand, concentrated ownership also has its costs. Large 
owners may engage in self-dealing, which can reduce efficiency. The findings of agency theory 
also indicate that control is a very good mechanism to assure that managers work to help 
owners. In other words, minority ownership should not improve a firm’s efficiency as control 
is very likely to be missing in such an ownership structure. On the other hand, even a minority 
owner, or a pair of minority owners with a sufficiently high stake could be able to control a 
firm; for example, La Porta et al. (1999) employ 20% as a threshold for control of a company. 
Further, empirical works show that majority owners can alter their behavior when a strong 
minority owner is present in the firm, for example in the case of dividend payments (Gugler, 
2003). Legal minority owners might not represent an excessive threat to a majority owner’s 
control but they can exert an important monitoring influence. Blocking minority owners might 
affect a firm’s efficiency via the implicitly influential decisions of the majority owner. On the 
other hand, blocking minority owners may quarrel with the majority owners and oppose 
decisions instead of monitoring, which may decrease firm efficiency. Finally, the majority and 
strong minority owners represent coalitions of so-called block owners, who own a major 
number of shares (>5%) and as a result are able to have a noteworthy disciplinary impact 
(Dilling-Hansen et al., 2003). Finally, the importance of the (high) ownership concentration 
with respect to a firm’s efficiency is solidly documented by Estrin et al. (2009) for new 
members of the EU. Based on the above arguments we formulate a baseline hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2. H0: Ownership concentration and the extent of control has no effect on 
firm efficiency. 
The null hypothesis is formulated in a general way so that it allows testing of various 
degrees of ownership concentration to capture, for example, the diminishing extent of control. 
Again, we do not present specific alternative hypotheses, although we believe that most of the 
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existing literature would expect that a higher ownership concentration and the extent of control 
it provides would contribute to a firm’s efficiency. 
Third, in the trade literature it has been argued that foreign owners have better access 
to technology and therefore multinational firms established through FDI and owned by foreign 
owners should be more efficient (Temouri et al., 2008; Blomström et al., 2001). The existence 
of a technological gap between foreign and domestic owners has become a stylized fact in the 
applied trade literature. Specifically in the European context, Mathur et al. (2004) show that 
foreign-owned firms involved in multinational operations do better in financial performance 
than purely domestic units. Similarly, Estrin et al. (2009) show that efficiency in foreign-owned 
(privatized) firms in new EU member countries is higher than in domestically owned firms. 
From this perspective, the distinction between domestic and foreign ownership represents an 
important implication with respect to FDI. From our data we are able to distinguish specific 
ownership stakes of 10% and up. A firm is considered a subject of direct investment if “the 
direct investor owns at least 10% of the voting power” (OECD 2008; p. 17) in the firm. In this 
case, the foreign domicile of the direct investor constitutes the origin of the FDI. Hence, based 
on our data, majority and minority control categories provide information about FDI ownership 
and we can analyze its impact on a firm’s efficiency. Based on the evidence related to FDI 
ownership, we formulate the third hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3. H0: Foreign ownership (through FDI) does not improve a firm’s 
efficiency. 
In our sample the new EU countries are those that underwent a transition from a 
command economy to a market economy. The literature on transition economies in general 
expects that foreign ownership leads to higher efficiency. Still, in the context of multinationals, 
a foreign-owned firm may potentially realize profit but the overall efficiency of such a 
multinational might be assessed in the country where the foreign owner is domiciled. 
Finally, despite the fact that the effect of the global crisis is not our primary topic, we 
estimate efficiency separately for pre-crisis and crisis periods, since a crisis can be disruptive 
to a firm’s operation. Our prior assumption is that during the crisis, a firm’s efficiency might 
suffer due to difficult conditions. Hence, the effect of a firm’s characteristics and ownership 
categories may change over time. In general, it is expected that a period of financial distress 
would push less efficient firms to become more efficient in order to survive. More efficient 
firms, on other hand, could lose their “advantage” due to a lack of pressure to improve. 
However, we admit that testing for crisis effects deserves a deeper investigation both in terms 
of theory and testing because of issues such as firms not knowing when a crisis will occur and 
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the industry specific impacts of recession. Since the discussion of the recession period deserves 
a separate paper, we do not formulate a separate hypothesis and offer a preliminary assessment 
via inferences made based on separate set of coefficients; more detailed assessment of the issue 
is left for further research. 
 
5. Empirical results 
In Tables 3–6 we present our key results for how firm efficiency is determined by firm 
characteristics, market concentration, and ownership. The results for old and new EU 
manufacturing firms are summarized in Tables 3 and 4 respectively, while Tables 5 and 6 report 
the results for old and new EU firms operating in services. All results are reported for both pre-
crisis (2001–2008) and post-crisis (2009–2011) periods. However, we draw our inferences 
primarily from coefficients associated with the pre-crisis period as it reflects a more standard 
operating environment. The post-crisis period coefficients offer complementary findings but, 
as we believe, they reflect rather irregular and disruptive business conditions (Angelopoulou 
et al., 2014). 
Coefficients associated with the distance from the efficiency frontier for a specific 
variable and specific period should be interpreted in the following manner. A fully efficient 
firm would have a distance from the efficiency frontier equal to zero. Hence, a positive value 
of a statistically significant coefficient associated with a variable indicates that this variable 
moves a firm away from the efficiency frontier. For example, a positive coefficient associated 
with a particular type of ownership category indicates that the specific ownership category is 
associated with a lower contribution to firm efficiency; the larger the coefficient, the greater 
distance and inefficiency it represents. However, even in the case of two positive coefficients, 
when their values decrease between two periods, we are able to identify an improvement in 
efficiency. On the other hand, a negative and statistically significant coefficient associated with 
a specific category indicates that the category helps to move a firm closer to the efficiency 
frontier: the firm becomes more efficient as the coefficient becomes smaller. To summarize, 
when comparing the effects of two different ownership categories, we simply look at the value 
of the associated coefficients: smaller the coefficient, the greater the contribution to a firm’s 
efficiency and vice versa. A similar interpretation applies to the effects of the firm and market 
characteristics.12  
                                                 
12 We performed a robustness check in that the second stage regression (3) was re-estimated with efficiency 
derived in the first stage when firm performance is measured by turnover instead of value added. Since the results 
are not materially different we do not report detailed results; they are available upon request. Further, since our 
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5.1 Effects of firm characteristics and market competition 
Results related to the size of the firms consistently differ across both EU regions. In the old EU 
countries larger firms are associated with lower efficiency, as witnessed by positive coefficients 
reported in Column 1 in Tables 3 and 5. During the post-crisis period negative coefficients 
indicate slight improvement in efficiency associated with firm size. In new EU countries, an 
overall lack of statistical significance precludes making inferences, with the exception of firms 
operating in services, where the coefficient is negative and rather small during the pre-crisis 
period (Column 1, Table 6). Still, based on our findings, we infer that larger firms can be 
associated with less efficiency in general. More importantly, the results are consistent with 
agency theory, which is a driver of the results.13 
The effect of capital structure on firm efficiency is uniform across firms. In line with 
Jensen (1986) and Dilling-Hansen et al (2003), we find that firms with higher leverage are 
closer to the efficiency frontier (negative coefficients) and hence, they are more efficient 
(Column 1, Table 3–6). However, debt does not contribute to firm efficiency of both old and 
new EU firms in the post-crisis period (Column 2, Table 3–6). The evidence is consistent with 
general wisdom that taking cash out of a firm eliminates or highly reduces the freedom of 
management to adopt dubious projects. The necessity of servicing the debt then puts pressure 
on a firm to become more efficient. Yet, highly leveraged firms may find it difficult to refinance 
their operations in the post-crisis period. 
Finally, we present results associated with market concentration (competition). We first 
differentiate between moderate and low competition at the local (country-specific) level. All 
the results are interpreted with respect to the high competition category. Moderate and low 
competition environments are found to be more conducive towards efficiency than high 
competition environment for old EU firms in the pre-crisis period (Column 1, Tables 3 and 5). 
Insignificant coefficients preclude the assessment of the effect in new EU countries in the pre-
                                                 
data set contains a substantial fraction of small firms, we re-estimated our specification with the data covering a 
control group of large and medium firms (we used the Amadeus classification to define firm size: a firm is 
considered to be medium-sized if it has operating revenue greater than 1 million Euro, total assets greater than 2 
million Euro, or at least 15 employees). A key reason is that we want to verify whether agency is a major driver 
of behavior for firms independent of their size or whether the size plays a role; our results show that coefficients 
for main and control group are not materially different. Second, in very small entrepreneurial firms, wages and 
dividends are often intertwined. This would tend to make the comparison biased towards small firms, because the 
observed wages partially include returns to capital. However, the results presented in this section are robust to this 
issue. 
13 The findings are also very similar to those derived separately for large and medium firms (not reported). Hence, 
we can infer that results are also robust with respect to the size of the firm itself. 
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crisis period (Column 1, Tables 4 and 6). Further, the beneficial effect of moderate and low 
competition towards efficiency is also observed in old and new EU manufacturing firms in the 
post-crisis period (Column 2, Tables 3 and 4). Even though the effects of moderate and low 
competition are about equally beneficial, it should not be overstated because firms operating 
in a low-competition sector have more space to adjust their prices and this translates positively 
into their profits. On other hand, firms operating under higher competition pressure have their 
margins quite narrow with little space to adjust, especially during a crisis. Lower margins result 
in less efficiency in financial terms. Hence, negative coefficients associated with low and 
moderate competition mean that firms operating in low- and moderate-competition sectors are 
more efficient in financial terms than high-competition firms. Lastly, coefficients associated 
with the measure of global competition indicate that both old and new EU manufacturing firms 
are right on the efficiency frontier but the coefficients are statistically significant only during 
the post-crisis period (Column 1, Tables 3 and 4).  
 
5.2 Ownership effects 
We assess our results from the perspective of Hypothesis 2 (outlined in section 4.4) on the 
effect of different ownership categories. By and large we find that a greater extent of control, 
or more concentrated ownership, means a stronger contribution towards firm. In particular, the 
types of ownership structures where an owner must account for the presence of other owner(s) 
with a non-marginal extent of control exhibit interesting contributions towards efficiency. 
Specific cases are presented below. 
Our results show that the majority ownership category produces the single most 
consistent effects across firms and industries. This type of control does not strongly contribute 
to firm efficiency in EU countries, as coefficients are chiefly positive during the decisive pre-
crisis period. The effect becomes contributive during the post-crisis and holds for firms with 
(transitory) and without (permanent) ownership structure changes. The exception from the 
former pattern is represented by a strong contributing effect of transitory domestic majority 
owners in old and new EU manufacturing firms (Column 1, Tables 3 and 4) and old EU service 
firms (Column 1, Table 5). The findings indicate that domestic majority owners are more 
beneficial for the efficiency in EU firms than foreign ones, but their impact is lower during the 
crisis period. This result is in accord with our prior assumption that concentrated ownership 
structure leads to higher firm efficiency via superior monitoring of managers (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997; Hill and Snell, 1989). However, the rest of our results convey a rather skeptical 
message about the role of majority owners in a standard business environment.  
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In firms where a majority owner is confronted with the presence of a legal minority 
owner (or owners), the effects of transitory and permanent monitored majority structures (with 
both domestic and foreign owners) is consistently helpful to efficiency in old EU firms during 
the pre-crisis period (Columns 1 and 3, Tables 3 and 5). For new EU firms most coefficients 
are insignificant (Columns 1 and 3, Tables 4 and 6). The effect erodes with the crisis, though 
(the exception is old EU domestic firms in manufacturing where the effect remains (Columns 
2 and 4, Table 3)). Taken together, the results show that there is an important positive 
disciplining effect on firm efficiency when a majority owner must account for the presence of 
a minority shareholder.  
Results for the category of firms where a majority owner must recognize a blocking 
minority shareholder also provide interesting insights. The beneficial aspects of this control 
arrangement are evidenced by negative coefficients related to the permanent effect of domestic 
owners in both manufacturing and service sectors and EU regions (Column 3, Tables 3–6) but 
only to old EU firms in service industries in case of foreign owners (Column 3, Table 5). The 
beneficial permanent effect remains during the post-crisis for old EU domestic firms. Further, 
when the size of the coefficients is considered, firms with a foreign majority and a blocking 
minority exhibit larger inter-temporal differences in coefficients than those with domestic 
owners. 
A blocking minority owner in charge whose stake is higher than the sum of stakes of 
all remaining known (identified) owners (controlling blocking minority ownership) is found to 
exert significant influence towards efficiency in old EU firms (Columns 1–4, Tables 3 and 5). 
The effect is beneficial for firms that experienced ownership changes during the pre-crisis 
period, but erodes with the crisis (Columns 1–2, Tables 3 and 5). In firms where the ownership 
does not change, the initially (pre-crisis) less contributing permanent effect improves (Columns 
3–4, Tables 3–6). 
Minority owners whose combined shares provide them with a majority of voting 
rights—combined controlling minority ownership—are a special ownership category in terms 
of their contribution to firm efficiency. In this category, two minority owners face a situation 
where neither of them can fully control the company and only coordinated steps in a functional 
coalition would enable them to jointly control the company. How does this arrangement work 
for firm efficiency? A combined controlling minority does not seem to work for firms during 
the pre-crisis period: the relevant positive coefficients (Columns 1 and 3, Tables 3–6) hint that 
owners do not cooperate effectively irrespective of the EU region or industry. On the contrary, 
this arrangement seems to be quite beneficial during the crisis. Here, negative coefficients hint 
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at a joint use of power between the two minority shareholders, of transitory status, and a 
contributing effect of this ownership arrangement with respect to firm efficiency, albeit only 
when there is no other choice. 
 
5.3 Foreign ownership effect 
Based on the ownership domicile information, we are also able to summarize the results related 
to Hypothesis 3 on the effect of foreign ownership through FDI. We discussed the specific 
influences of owners, including foreign ones, when assessing the effect of the diminishing 
extent of control on firm efficiency in section 5.2. Now we summarize the specific effect of 
foreign owners. There are two categories where the contributing effect of foreign owners is 
clearly visible irrespective of EU region: firms where a majority owner must recognize either 
legal or a blocking minority shareholders. In the other cases, on average, domestic owners 
exhibit a more beneficial effect. 
The finding might come as no surprise in old EU countries: here foreign owners are 
present in domestic firms through their FDI, which mostly originates from within the old EU 
group itself. Further, based on the UNCTAD (2004) report, foreign owners in the old EU group 
are present to a much smaller degree than in the rest of our sample, since the FDI flows to 
developed countries were gradually shrinking. On the other hand, firms from the old EU 
countries were actively acquiring assets in new member states, and their accession in 2004 
boosted new FDI from the old EU group, totaling around 67–75% of total FDI in new EU 
member countries (UNCTAD, 2004). The beneficial effects of foreign owners subjected to 
legal or blocking minority control in new EU countries may be taken as evidence of corporate 
governance that gradually improved over time, without doubt thanks also to the FDI inflow 
from old EU countries that overwhelmingly dominated FDI in the 12 new EU members 
(UNCTAD, 2008).14 
Overall, the contributing effect of foreign owners is primarily limited to majority 
categories with control by legal and blocking minorities. The result indicates a strong 
implication with regard to the disciplining effect of the two specific ownership structures 
involving foreign owners. 
Although not reported, all the results are also robust to the alternative measure of performance 
(sales). Our findings also hold for the subsample of medium and large firms. 
                                                 
14 Uzagalieva et al. (2012) show that local firms in the new EU markets experience efficiency gains if they 
supply industries with a higher share of foreign firms or if foreign firms sell to them. 
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6. Conclusion 
In this paper we analyze the effects of size, competition, capital and ownership structure on 
firm efficiency in a comprehensive dataset using the stochastic frontier approach. One of our 
important contributions to the literature is a focus on technical efficiency of firms instead of 
accounting ratios. Private firms have incentive to minimize reported taxable income (Daily and 
Dollinger 1992; Durand and Vargas, 2003), therefore, accounting measures should be used with 
caution in studies of privately held companies (Schulze et al, 2001). Given that private firms 
constitute the vast majority of our sample, focus on technical efficiency ― a firm’s ability to 
produce the maximum output from a given set of inputs ― represents a considerable advantage 
as it may be less prone to manipulations by managers. 
Our findings highlight that larger firms are characterized by lower efficiency. This result might 
be driven by higher bureaucracy, higher communication costs and a greater resistance to change 
in large firms compared to smaller firms. Capital structure and concentrated ownership are also 
found to be important for firm efficiency as they promote managerial discipline. We pay special 
attention to firm ownership structure and distinguish between different degrees of control by 
owners and ownership domicile. As a result, we are able to document the effects of different 
ownership structures on firm efficiency to an extent not found in previous studies.  
In the analysis, we also distinguish between a pre-crisis period (2001-2008) and a post-crisis 
period (2009-2011). Our results are found to be sensitive to the period of observation. 
Therefore, we interpret patterns observed for the post-crisis period with caution and base our 
conclusion mostly on the pre-crisis period. A full investigation the implications of 2008 
financial crisis on efficiency is left for future research.  
 25 
References 
Aghion, P., Dewatripont, M., Rey, P., 1999. Competition, Financial Discipline and Growth. The 
Review of Economic Studies 66(4), 825-852.  
Aigner, D., Lovell, C., Schmidt, P., 1977. Formulation and estimation of stochastic frontier 
production functions. Journal of Econometrics, 6, 21-37. 
Aitken, B. J., Harrison, A. E. (1999). Do domestic firms benefit from direct foreign investment? 
Evidence from Venezuela. American economic review, 605-618. 
Amornkitvikai, Y., Harvie, C., 2011. Finance, Ownership, Executive Remuneration, and 
Technical Efficiency: A Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) of Thai Listed 
Manufacturing Enterprises. Australasian Accounting Business and Finance Journal 
5(1), 35-55. 
Anderson, R., Reeb, D., 2003. Founding family ownership, corporate diversification, and firm 
leverage. Journal of Law and Economics 46, 653–684. 
Angelopoulou, E., Balfoussia, H., Gibson, H.D., 2014. Building a financial conditions index 
for the euro area and selected euro area countries: What does it tell us about the crisis? 
Economic Modelling, 38, 392–403. 
Arocena, P., and Oliveros, D., 2012. The efficiency of state-owned and privatized firms: Does 
ownership make a difference? International Journal of Production Economics, 140(1), 
457-465. 
Bailey, S. D., 1992. Industrial efficiency in six nations. R. E. Caves (Ed.). MIT Press. 
Barth, E., Gulbrandsen, T., Schønea, P., 2005. Family ownership and productivity: the role of 
owner-management. Journal of Corporate Finance, 11(1), 107-127. 
Battese, G. E., Coelli T. J, 1988. Prediction of firm-level technical efficiencies with a 
generalized frontier production function and panel data. Journal of Econometrics 38, 
387–399. 
Battese, G. E., Coelli, T. J., 1992. Frontier production functions, technical efficiency and panel 
data: with application to paddy farmers in India. Journal of Productivity analysis, 3,1/2, 
153-69. 
Battese, G. E., Coelli, T. J., 1995.. A model for technical inefficiency effect in a stochastic 
frontier production function. Empirical Economics, 20, 325-332. 
Belenzon, S., Patacconi, A., Zarutskie, R., 2014. Married to the Firm? A Large-Scale 
Investigation of the Social Context of Ownership. Duke University, Working paper. 
Blomström, M., Globerman, S., Kokko A., 2001.The Determinants of Host Country Spillovers 
from Foreign Direct Investment. In N. Pain (ed.), Inward Investment, Technological 
Change and Growth. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Bloom, N., Van Reenen, J., 2007. Measuring and explaining management practices across firms 
and countries. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(4), 1351-408. 
Bottasso, A., Sembenelli, A.. 2004. Does ownership affect firms’ efficiency? Panel data 
evidence on Italy. Empirical Economics 29(4), 769-786. 
Brailsford, T., Oliver, B., Pua, S., 2002. On the relation between ownership structure and capital 
structure, Accounting and Finance 42, 1–26. 
Cabeza-García, L., Gómez-Ansón, S., 2011. Post-privatisation ownership concentration: 
Determinants and influence on firm efficiency. Journal of Comparative Economics, 
39(3), 412-430. 
 26 
Campa, J. M., & Kedia, S. (2002). Explaining the diversification discount. The Journal of 
Finance, 57(4), 1731-1762. 
Caves, R. E., Barton, D. R., 1990. Efﬁciency in US manufacturing industries. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press. 
Chirinko, R. S., Fazzari, S. M., and Meyer, A. P., 2010. A New Approach to Estimating 
Production Function Parameters: The Elusive Capital–Labor Substitution Elasticity. 
Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 29(4), 587-594. 
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, J., Lang, L., 2002. Disentangling the incentive and 
entrenchment effects of large shareholdings. Journal of Finance, 57 (6), 2741–2771. 
Coelli T., Prasada Rao D. S., Battese G. E., 2005. An Introduction to Efficiency and Productivity 
Analysis, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Cornwell, C. M., Smith, P. C., 2008. Stochastic Frontier Analysis and Efficiency Estimation, 
in The Econometrics of Panel Data, Patrick Sevestre and László Mátyás, (eds.). Springer 
Verlag, 697- 726. 
Daily, C. M., Dollinger, M. J., 1992. An empirical examination of ownership structure in family 
and professionally managed firms. Family business review, 5(2), 117-136. 
Demsetz, H., 1996. The economics of the business firm: seven critical commentaries. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Demsetz, H., Lehn, K., 1985. The structure of corporate ownership: causes and consequences. 
Journal of Political Economy, 93(6), 1155–1177. 
Demsetz, H., Villalonga, B., 2001. Ownership structure and corporate performance, Journal of 
Corporate Finance 7(3), 209-233. 
Dhawan, R., 2001, Firm size and productivity differential: theory and evidence from a panel of 
US firms. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 44(3), 269-293. 
Diaz, A., Sanchez, R., 2008. Firm size and productivity in Spain: a stochastic frontier analysis. 
Small Business Economics, 30(3), 315–323. 
Dilling-Hansen, M., Madsen, E., Smith, V., 2003. Efficiency, R&D and ownership – some 
empirical evidence. International Journal of Production Economics, 83(1), 85-94. 
Duc Nam, P., Thi Phuong Vy, L., 2013. Foreign Ownership, Capital Structure and Firm 
Performance: Empirical Evidence from Vietnamese Listed Firms. IUP Journal Of 
Corporate Governance, 12(2), 40-58. 
Durand, R., Vargas, V., 2003. Ownership, organization, and private firms' efficient use of 
resources. Strategic Management Journal, 24(7), 667-675. 
Estrin, S., Hanousek, J., Kočenda, E., Svejnar, J., 2009. Effects of Privatization and Ownership 
in Transition Economies. Journal of Economic Literature, 47(3), 699-728. 
Francis, J. R., Michas, P. N., Seavey, S. E., 2013, Does Audit Market Concentration Harm the 
Quality of Audited Earnings? Evidence from Audit Markets in 42 Countries. 
Contemporary Accounting Research, 30(1), 325–355. 
Frank, M. Z., & Goyal, V. K. (2009). Capital structure decisions: which factors are reliably 
important? Financial management, 38(1), 1-37. 
Fried, H. O., Lovell C. A. K., Schmidt S. S. (eds.), 1993. The Measurement of Productive 
Efficiency: Techniques and Applications. Oxford University Press, New York. 
Fukuyama, H., Guerra, R., Weber, W., 1999. Efficiency and ownership: Evidence from 
Japanese credit cooperatives. Journal of Economic and Business, 51(6), 473-487. 
 27 
Goldar, B., Renganathan, V., Banga, R., 2003. Ownership and Efficiency in Engineering Firms: 
1990-91 to 1999-2000. Economic and Political Weekly, 39(5), 441-447. 
Greene, W., 2005. Fixed and random effects in stochastic frontier models. Journal of 
Productivity Analysis, 23(1), 7-32. 
Greene, W., 2008. The Measurement of Efficiency, chap. The Econometric Approach to 
Efficiency Analysis. Oxford University Press. 
Green, A., Mayes, D. G., 1991. Technical inefficiency in manufacturing industries. The 
Economic Journal, 523-538. 
Gugler, K. (Ed.), 2001. Corporate Governance and Economic Performance. Oxford University 
Press, Oxford. 
Gugler, K., 2003. Corporate Governance, Dividend Payout Policy, and the Interrelation 
between Dividends, R&D, and Capital Investment. Journal of Banking and Finance, 
27(7), 1297–1321. 
Hanousek, J., Kočenda, E., Mašika, M., 2012. Firm Efficiency: Domestic Owners, Coalitions, 
and FDI. Economic Systems, 36(4), 471-486. 
Harris, M., Raviv, A., 1991. The theory of capital structure. Journal of Finance, 46(1), 297–
355. 
Hill, W. L., Snell, S. A., 1989. Effects of Ownership Structure and Control on Corporate 
Productivity. The Academy of Management Journal, 32(1), 25-46. 
Holderness, C.,Sheehan, D., 1988. The role of majority shareholders in publicly held 
corporations: An exploratory analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 20(1), 317-
346.  
Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2010). The Federal Trade Commission and the Department of 
Justice. 
Jensen, M., Meckling, W., 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and 
capital structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-360. 
Jensen, M., 1986. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. American 
Economic Review, 76(2), 323–329. 
Khumbhakar, S. C., 1990. Production Frontiers, Panel Data, and Time-Varying Technical 
Inefficiency. Journal of Econometrics. 46(1), 201-211. 
Kumbhakar, S. C., Lovell, C. K., 2000. Stochastic Frontier Analysis. Cambridge University 
Press. 
Kim, C., Mauer, D. C., Sherman A. E., 1998. The determinants of corporate liquidity: theory 
and evidence. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 33(3), 335-359. 
King, M., Santor, E., 2008. Family values: Ownership structure, performance and capital 
structure od Canadian firms. Journal of Banking and Finance 32(11), 2423-2432. 
Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., 1999. Corporate ownership around the world. 
Journal of Finance, 54(2), 471–517. 
Leibenstein, H., 1966. Allocative efficiency vs. ‘X-efficiency’. American Economic Review, 
56, 392–415. 
MacKay, P., Phillips, G. M. (2005). How Does Industry Affect Firm Financial Structure? 
Review of Financial Studies, 18(4), 1433-1466. 
Mansi, S. A., Reeb, D. M. (2002). Corporate diversification: what gets discounted? The Journal 
of Finance, 57(5), 2167-2183. 
 28 
Margaritis, D., Psillaki, M., 2007. Capital structure and firm efficiency, Journal of Business 
Finance and Accounting 34(9)&(10), 1447-1469. 
Margaritis, D., Psillaki, M., 2010. Capital structure, equity ownership and firm performance. 
Journal of Banking and Finance, 34(3), 621-632. 
Mathur, I., Singh, M., Gleason, K. C., 2004. Multinational Diversification and Corporate 
Performance: Evidence from European Firms. European Financial Management, 
10(3), 439–464. 
McConnell, J., Servaes, H., 1990. Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate 
value. Journal of Financial Economics, 27(2), 595–612. 
Meeusen, W., Van den Broeck, J., 1977. Efficiency estimation from Cobb-Douglas production 
functions with composed error. International Economic Review, 18(2), 435-444. 
Mok, V., Yeung, G., Han, Z., Li, Z., 2007. Leverage, Technical Efficiency and Profitability: an 
application of DEA to foreign-invested toy manufacturing firms in China. Journal of 
Contemporary China, 16(51), 259-274. 
Monsen, R. J., Downs, A. (1965). A theory of large managerial firms. The Journal of Political 
Economy, 221-236. 
Morck, R., Shleifer A., Vishny R., 1988. Management ownership and market valuation: an 
empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 20(1), 293-315. 
Mueller, D. C. (1972). A life cycle theory of the firm. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 
199-219. 
Myers, S., 1977. Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics, 5(2), 
147–175. 
Nanka-Bruce, D., 2006. Corporate ownership and technical efficiency analysis in the Spanish 
real estate sector. Corporate Ownership & Control, 4(2), 100-113. 
Nickell, S. J., 1997. Unemployment and labour market rigidities: Europe versus North 
America. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11(3), 55–74. 
OECD, 2008. OECD Benchmark definition of foreign direct investment: fourth edition. Paris: 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
Palia, D., Lichtenberg, F., 1999. Managerial ownership and firm performance: A re-
examination using productivity measurement. Journal of Corporate Finance, 5(4), 323-
339. 
Raith, M. 2003. Competition, Risk, and Managerial Incentives. The American Economic 
Review, 93(4), 1425-1436.  
Ross, S. A., Westerfield, R. W., Jeffrey, J., 2005. Corporate Finance, 7th International edition; 
McGraw Hill. 
Roy, W., Yvrande-Billon, A., 2007. Ownership, contractual practices and technical efficiency: 
The case of urban public transport in France. Journal of Transport Economics and 
Policy, 41(2), 257-282. 
Sánchez-Ballesta, J. P., García-Meca, E., 2007. A Meta-Analytic Vision of the Effect of 
Ownership Structure on Firm Performance. Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, 15(5), 1467-8683. 
Schulze, W. S., Lubatkin, M. H., Dino, R. N., Buchholtz, A. K., 2001. Agency relationships in 
family firms: Theory and evidence. Organization science, 12(2), 99-116. 
 29 
Seelanatha, S. L., 2010. Determinants of Capital Structure: Further Evidence from China. 
Economics, Management, and Financial Markets, 5(4), 106-126. 
Sena, V., 2006. The Determinants of Firm's Performance: Can Finance Constraints Improve 
Technical Efficiency? European Journal of Operational Research, 172(1), 311-325. 
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R. W., 1997. A Survey of Corporate Governance. Journal of Finance, 
52(2), 737-83. 
Schmidt, P.,  Sickles, R. C. (1984). Production frontiers and panel data. Journal of Business & 
Economic Statistics, 2(4), 367-374. 
Short, H., Keasey, K., Duxbury, D., 2002. Capital structure, management ownership and large 
external shareholders: a UK analysis. International Journal of the Economics of 
Business, 9(3), 375–399. 
Shyu, J., 2013. Ownership structure, capital structure, and performance of group affiliation: 
Evidence from Taiwanese group-affiliated firms. Managerial Finance, 39(4), 404–
420. 
Stulz, R., 1990. Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 26(1), 3-27. 
Temouri, Y., Driffield, N. L., Higón, D. A., 2008. Analysis of productivity differences among 
foreign and domestic firms: Evidence from Germany. The Review of World Economics, 
144(1), 32-54. 
Thomsen, S., Pedersen, T., 1998. Industry and ownership structure. International Review of 
Law and Economics, 18(4), 386–404. 
Thomsen, S., Pedersen, T., 2000. Ownership structure and economic performance in the largest 
European companies. Strategic Management Journal, 21(6), 689-705.  
Thomsen, S., Pedersen, T., Kvist, H., 2006. Blockholder ownership: Effects on firm value in 
market and control based governance systems. Journal of Corporate Finance, 12(2), 
246-269. 
Tian, L., Estrin, S., 2008. Retained state shareholding in Chinese PLCs: Does government 
ownership always reduce corporate value? Journal of Comparative Economics, 36(1), 
74-89. 
UNCTAD, 2004. World Investment Report 2003. FDI Policies for Development: National and 
International Perspectives. UN, New York and Geneva. 
UNCTAD, 2008. World Investment Report 2008. Transnational Corporations and the 
Infrastructure Challenge. UN, New York and Geneva. 
Uzagalieva, A., Kočenda, E., Menezes, A., 2012. Technological Innovation in New European 
Union Markets. Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 48(5), 51–69. 
Villalonga, B. (2004). Diversification discount or premium? New evidence from the business 
information tracking series. The Journal of Finance, 59(2), 479-506. 
Wahba, H., 2014. Capital structure, managerial ownership and firm performance: evidence 
from Egypt. Journal of Management & Governance, 18(4), 1041-1061.. 
Weill, L., 2008. Leverage and Corporate Performance: Does Institutional Environment 
Matter?. Small Business Economics, 30(3, 251-265. 
 30 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics (Manufacturing sector) 
Group Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs 
O
ld
 E
U
 M
em
b
er
s 
Value Added 1.94 14.43 1.44E-06 7148.75 1,230,649 
Turnover 4.45 27.57 1.18E-06 13109.46 1,230,649 
Tangible Fixed Assets 0.71 4.73 1.00E-06 346.40 1,230,649 
Capital 0.25 1.66 1.27E-06 768.70 1,299,872 
Number of Employees 22.23 144.72 1 61000 1,230,649 
Size 13.30 1.99 0.46 19.11 1,279,630 
Leverage 0.17 0.25 0.00 1.56 1,029,930 
N
ew
 E
U
 M
em
b
er
s 
Value Added 1.09 52.50 6.35E-06 13240.26 105,099 
Turnover 2.40 13.28 2.99E-07 2943.01 236,585 
Tangible Fixed Assets 4.80 33.14 1.00E-06 2820.65 248,117 
Capital 0.40 10.89 2.99E-07 3796.04 250,575 
Number of Employees 24.64 119.55 0 30714 249,731 
Size 12.02 2.34 2.99 18.83 250,067 
Leverage 0.10 0.19 0.00 2.63 133,116 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics (Service sector) 
Group Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs 
O
ld
 E
U
 M
em
b
er
s 
Value Added 1.95 49.66 1.34E-06 18080.89 1,894,239 
Turnover 2.33 110.14 1.18E-06 62759.36 1,894,239 
Tangible Fixed Assets 0.25 2.42 1.00E-06 369.69 2,690,008 
Capital 0.18 32.57 0.00 58390.61 3,232,410 
Number of Employees 11.53 91.40 1 41311 1,894,239 
Size 11.92 2.32 0.46 19.11 3,117,137 
Leverage 0.13 0.25 0.00 1.56 1,894,239 
N
ew
 E
U
 M
em
b
er
s 
Value Added 0.39 2.54 3.59E-06 392.94 265,672 
Turnover 0.64 6.09 9.00E-08 1843.81 405,085 
Tangible Fixed Assets 0.97 13.27 1.00E-06 3170.77 434,364 
Capital 0.10 1.98 9.13E-08 694.05 445,833 
Number of Employees 8.92 82.21 1 27273 442,083 
Size 10.71 2.14 2.99 18.82 443,449 
Leverage 0.06 0.17 0 2.35 265,672 
 
Note: Value added, turnover, tangible fixed assets and capital are in mil. USD. Capital is defined as the sum of 
tangible fixed assets and working capital. Size is a natural logarithm of total assets and leverage is total 
liabilities over total assets. 
Old EU: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
UK. 
New EU: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovak Republic. 
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Table 3. Efficiency in manufacturing industries: Old EU countries 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
General  Pre-crisis Crisis   
characteristics (2003-2008) (2009-2011)   
     
Size 0.005*** -0.001***   
(ln(Total assets)) (0.000) (0.000)   
Leverage -0.038*** 0.015***   
(Debt/Total assets) (0.001) (0.001)   
Moderate competition -0.005*** -0.009***   
 (0.000) (0.001)   
Low competition -0.009*** -0.006***   
 (0.001) (0.001)   
Global competition -0.000 0.000***   
  (0.000) (0.000)   
 Transitory effect Permanent effect 
Ownership categories Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-crisis Crisis 
  (2003-2008) (2009-2011) (2003-2008) (2009-2011) 
Majority (domestic) -0.020*** 0.015*** 0.009*** 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Majority (foreign) 0.019*** -0.009*** 0.003*** -0.003*** 
  (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Monitored majority -0.004 -0.004** -0.009*** -0.008*** 
(domestic) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Monitored majority -0.019*** 0.015*** -0.019*** -0.002 
(foreign) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
Majority & blocking -0.002 0.000 -0.014*** -0.011*** 
minority (domestic) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
Majority & blocking -0.024*** 0.005* -0.007 0.003 
minority (foreign) (0.009) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) 
Controlling blocking -0.005*** 0.003*** 0.003*** -0.001*** 
minority (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Combined controlling 0.004*** -0.003*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 
minority (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Crisis   0.151***     
    (0.003)     
Country dummies N/A YES 
R2 0.650 0.263 
Number of observations 1,029,273 
 
Note: The dependent variable is the distance from the efficiency frontier obtained from the first stage where 
corporate performance (measured as value added) was related to essential inputs: capital (proxied by sum of total 
fixed assets and working capital) and labor (proxied by number of employees). Coefficients show the effects of 
each ownership category or firm characteristic to moving a firm towards or away from the efficiency frontier: the 
smaller the coefficient is, the more each specific factor contributes to firm efficiency. 
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are shown in 
parentheses. 
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Table 4. Efficiency in manufacturing industries: New EU countries 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
General  Pre-crisis Crisis  
characteristics (2003-2008) (2009-2011)  
     
Size -0.001 -0.002  
(ln(Total assets)) (0.001) (0.002)  
Leverage -0.027*** -0.006  
(Debt/Total assets) (0.008) (0.007)  
Moderate competition 0.006 -0.012***  
 (0.004) (0.005)  
Low competition 0.004 -0.014**  
 (0.004) (0.007)  
Global competition -0.000 0.000*  
  (0.000) (0.000)   
 Transitory effect Permanent effect 
Ownership categories Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-crisis Crisis 
  (2003-2008) (2009-2011) (2003-2008) (2009-2011) 
Majority (domestic) -0.014** 0.006 0.022*** -0.000 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) 
Majority (foreign) 0.003 -0.016*** 0.001 -0.006** 
  (0.003) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) 
Monitored majority 0.011 -0.013 0.007 0.025*** 
(domestic) (0.017) (0.012) (0.008) (0.006) 
Monitored majority -0.003 0.008 0.014* 0.031*** 
(foreign) (0.017) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008) 
Majority & blocking 0.001 0.001 -0.009 -0.007 
minority (domestic) (0.026) (0.015) (0.011) (0.009) 
Majority & blocking -0.026 0.004 0.027** 0.021** 
minority (foreign) (0.036) (0.018) (0.012) (0.010) 
Controlling blocking 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.004* 
minority (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) 
Combined controlling -0.002 -0.000 0.008*** 0.000 
minority (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
Crisis   0.079***     
    (0.023)     
Country dummies N/A YES 
R2 0.253 0.173 
Number of observations 105,099 
 
Note: The dependent variable is the distance from the efficiency frontier obtained from the first stage where 
corporate performance (measured as value added) was related to essential inputs: capital (proxied by sum of total 
fixed assets and working capital) and labor (proxied by number of employees). Coefficients show the effects of 
each ownership category or firm characteristic to moving a firm towards or away from the efficiency frontier: the 
smaller the coefficient is, the more each specific factor contributes to firm efficiency. 
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are shown in 
parentheses. 
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Table 5. Efficiency in service industries: Old EU countries 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
General  Pre-crisis Crisis  
characteristics (2003-2008) (2009-2011)  
     
Size 0.003*** -0.003***  
(ln(Total assets)) (0.000) (0.000)  
Leverage -0.020*** 0.013***  
(Debt/Total assets) (0.000) (0.001)  
Moderate competition -0.043*** 0.008***  
 (0.000) (0.000)  
Low competition -0.035*** 0.004***  
 (0.000) (0.000)  
 Transitory effect Permanent effect 
Ownership categories Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-crisis Crisis 
  (2003-2008) (2009-2011) (2003-2008) (2009-2011) 
Majority (domestic) -0.011*** 0.013*** 0.010*** 0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Majority (foreign) 0.022*** -0.011*** 0.005*** -0.006*** 
  (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Monitored majority -0.008*** 0.005*** -0.007*** -0.003*** 
(domestic) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Monitored majority -0.020*** 0.019*** -0.016*** -0.002 
(foreign) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Majority & blocking -0.001 0.001 -0.015*** -0.002 
minority (domestic) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Majority & blocking -0.008 0.011*** -0.022*** 0.007** 
minority (foreign) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
Controlling blocking -0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004*** -0.001*** 
minority (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Combined controlling 0.005*** -0.004*** 0.008*** -0.000 
minority (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Crisis   0.167***     
    (0.002)     
Country dummies N/A YES 
R2 0.775 0.324 
Number of observations 1,859,838 
 
Note: The dependent variable is the distance from the efficiency frontier obtained from the first stage where 
corporate performance (measured as value added) was related to essential inputs: capital (proxied by sum of total 
fixed assets and working capital) and labor (proxied by number of employees). Coefficients show the effects of 
each ownership category or firm characteristic to moving a firm towards or away from the efficiency frontier: the 
smaller the coefficient is, the more each specific factor contributes to firm efficiency. 
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are shown in 
parentheses. 
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Table 6. Efficiency in service industries: New EU countries 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
General  Pre-crisis Crisis  
characteristics (2003-2008) (2009-2011)  
     
Size -0.002*** -0.000  
(ln(Total assets)) (0.000) (0.002)  
Leverage -0.026*** -0.008  
(Debt/Total assets) (0.006) (0.010)  
Moderate competition 0.005 0.010  
 (0.003) (0.010)  
Low competition -0.003 0.003  
 (0.004) (0.008)  
 Transitory effect Permanent effect 
Ownership categories Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-crisis Crisis 
  (2003-2008) (2009-2011) (2003-2008) (2009-2011) 
Majority (domestic) -0.007 0.021*** 0.030*** -0.009*** 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.001) (0.003) 
Majority (foreign) 0.003 -0.015** 0.000 0.002 
  (0.002) (0.007) (0.001) (0.003) 
Monitored majority 0.009 -0.014 -0.019*** 0.019*** 
(domestic) (0.012) (0.017) (0.006) (0.006) 
Monitored majority -0.014 0.041 0.028*** -0.008 
(foreign) (0.020) (0.029) (0.006) (0.010) 
Majority & blocking 0.014 0.004 -0.032*** 0.003 
minority (domestic) (0.017) (0.033) (0.006) (0.012) 
Majority & blocking 0.012 0.027 0.002 -0.013 
minority (foreign) (0.021) (0.036) (0.008) (0.014) 
Controlling blocking -0.003 0.006 0.006*** -0.005** 
minority (0.002) (0.007) (0.001) (0.003) 
Combined controlling 0.001 0.000 0.004*** 0.005** 
minority (0.002) (0.006) (0.001) (0.002) 
Crisis   0.012     
    (0.025)     
Country dummies N/A YES 
R2 0.094 0.041 
Number of observations 226,265 
 
Note: The dependent variable is the distance from the efficiency frontier obtained from the first stage where 
corporate performance (measured as value added) was related to essential inputs: capital (proxied by sum of total 
fixed assets and working capital) and labor (proxied by number of employees). Coefficients show the effects of 
each ownership category or firm characteristic to moving a firm towards or away from the efficiency frontier: the 
smaller the coefficient is, the more each specific factor contributes to firm efficiency. 
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are shown in 
parentheses. 
 
